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Docility and “through doing” morality: 















In this paper, we aim at presenting the distributed morality approach as it can be 
described by the docility model of social interactions. The proposition “morality is a 
matter of social interaction” constitutes our starting point. We aim at pointing out the 
ways through which individuals create moral alternatives to a given situation. The 
paper is dedicated to presenting morality as something connected to human cognition. 
We introduce a “manipulative” way of thinking about morality, and we argue that it is 
“distributed” through things, animals, computers, and other human beings (section I); 
furthermore, the idea of a type of “through doing” morality comes up. Then, we find 
that this model supports an alternative view of the socio-economic system and, 
therefore, we suggest that the docility model (section II, as amended from Simon’s 
original model 1990; 1993), fits the case. The field of business ethics exempts useful 
insights from research on this issue. Recent studies on moral thinking and moral 
imagination seem to support this research project. 
 







Morality is a matter of social interaction. This appears to be an anti-Kantian statement, 
however this is not true. We state that moral thinking and behavior are connected to 
social interactions, since these interpersonal conditions provide the grounds for morality 
to emerge. From an anthropological angle, moral conditioning arises from basic social 
needs (Humphrey, 1976). Moreover, ethical theories belong to inter-individual 
interactions, so that the categorical imperative or that is to say, what we think of as 
eminently rational, is also linked to how, where, and when we experience our lives. 
In this paper, we do not discuss the origin of the categorical imperative or of Kantian or 
Rawlsian ethics, although we consider this issue highly important. The assumption that 
“morality is a matter of social interaction” constitutes the main hypothesis of the article. 
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We start from such a proposition aiming to point out the ways through which 
individuals create moral alternatives to a given situation. Thus the problem to be tackled 
here rests in understanding how individuals lean on the social context to build up moral 
concepts. Moreover, we need to specify what kind of links individuals create in their 
ordinary moral thought, and how we can say this as a social attitude. 
The paper is dedicated to a new approach to morality that is strictly related to some 
hypotheses on human cognition. We introduce a “manipulative” way of thinking about 
morality, and we argue that it is “distributed” through things, animals, computers, and 
other human beings that can be found in the context in which individuals operate 
(section I). Once we have outlined a model of the distributed approach to morality, we 
find that this supports an alternative view of the socio-economic system. Therefore, we 
present (section II) a model of social interaction that supports the hypotheses we made 
on how cognition and morality work. We refer to the “docility” model, as amended 
from Simon’s original (1990; 1993). 
We believe that these original approaches to morality and to how the social system 
works offer a very powerful tool for the understanding of human thinking and behavior. 
Moreover, we suggest that the field of business ethics could gain useful insights from 
investing in more research on the issue. Recent studies on moral thinking and moral 
imagination (above all, Werhane, 1999) provide concrete support for our idea. 
 
 
Distributed morality and the role of moral mediators. 
An alternative approach to ethics 
 
In this section we will introduce an alternative perspective on morality, which is based 
on recent advancements in the area of distributed cognition. Following ideas put 
forward in Magnani’s recent work (2006c), we will illustrate how the capacity for 
seeing the world morally, and acting accordingly, heavily depends upon the external 
resources employed, more heavily in fact, than moral philosophers and ethicists 
previously thought. In the first part, we will describe how morality can be considered as 
a “through doing” activity. We will present a series of examples to clarify this point. In 
the second part, we will outline the notion of the moral mediator, introduced by 
Magnani (2005b), as a key concept in explaining this new perspective on ethics and 
morality. 
 
Morality as a “through doing” activity 
As a matter of fact, and following Simon’s (1947; 1955) arguments, we maintain that 
human beings are problem solvers. They are continuously engaged in solving problems 
all day long, every day. Some of them are more trivial, such as choosing the clothes to 
wear or buying a car. Others are much more complicated: for instance, choosing which 
university to attend, changing job, deciding whether to marry Suzie or John, whether to 
invest in a Chinese corporation, to fund a charity or support Greenpeace, etc. Some of 
these are labeled as moral problems, since they involve other people: their health and 
happiness and everything that concerns their life as human beings.  
Ethical deliberation, and morality in general, can be considered as a problem solving 
activity in which people try to apply pre-existing solutions and/or generate new ones to 
complete the various tasks they face. However, as in any kind of problem solving 
activity, ethical deliberation is based on intrinsically incomplete information, because it  
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is impossible for anyone to be aware of every fact related to any given subject. That has 
important theoretical implications: 1) having incomplete information means that our 
deliberations and decisions are never the best possible answer, but they are at least 
satisficing; 2) our conclusions are always withdrawable (i.e. questionable, or never 
final). That is, once we get more information about a certain situation that involves 
some moral concern, we can always revise our previous decisions and think of 
alternative pathways that we could not “see” before; 3) a great part of our efforts in 
solving a moral task are devoted to elaborating conjectures or hypotheses in order to 
obtain more adequate information. Within this framework, conjecturing is essentially an 
act that permits us to manipulate our problem, and the representation we have of it, so 
that we may eventually acquire more “valuable” data. In this sense, we maintain that 
morality is manipulative in its essence, because it deals with changing and manipulating 
the world in order to overcome the unsatisfactory character of the options that are 
immediately available.  
In generating conjectures and hypotheses, people also used to rely on external resources 
that helped their capacity to think of a problem in moral terms.  Recent studies on the 
so-called “distributed cognition” approach have questioned some of the assumptions 
behind human cognition and the way it really works (Wilson, 1994, 2004; Hutchins, 
1995; Clark and Chalmers, 1998; Kirsh, 1999; Donald, 2001; Clark, 2003; Magnani, 
2006b, 2006c). In particular, it has been argued that human cognition cannot be 
regarded as something that happens only within the isolated brain (Wilson, 2004). As a 
matter of fact, people are limited and therefore they usually lean on external resources 
that can be of various kinds (Clark and Chalmers, 1998): a sheet of paper, a computer, a 
pen, and so on. External resources play a crucial role, and not only in accomplishing 
tasks that have a certain moral angle (Magnani, 2005a; 2005b; 2006c; Magnani and 
Bardone, 2006). 
To clarify this point, consider the following case. Suppose that John has quarreled with 
a friend named Jane. John is very angry and thus he decides to write an email to Jane in 
which he expresses his profound irritation. Once finished, John re-reads the message he 
furiously jotted down, and then decides that it is too nasty to send to his friend. A 
“sending confirmation message” pops up and he decides not to send his email. What is 
the cognitive meaning of John’s decision? 
In this case, John’s decision not to email Jane can be considered as a result of a 
manipulative activity that is mainly tacit and implicit, in which the role of the external 
resources (software, in this case) is crucial. The decision to write and then re-read 
allows him to manipulate his feelings and emotions so that new and previously 
unavailable information and reasons are successfully unearthed. New moral options and 
chances are thus created. 
Now the question is: how could we take into account processes like this one, if we 
consider morality as a business that is related only to the application of rules, 
imperatives or guidelines? As the example shows, ethical deliberation and morality are 
expressed not only in words at a verbal/propositional level (Johnson, 1993) but also 
though model-based and “through doing” processes (Magnani, 2006c). This is the basic 
point we want to stress in this paper. 
As mentioned above, people often exploit external supports (for example, language but 
also technological innovations) to enhance their moral efforts in a completely tacit 
fashion as the example tells us. We can distinguish two main different types of moral 
behavior employed by human beings. The first type is related to selecting the most  
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appropriate course of action from a library of pre-existing behavioral templates that can 
be considered as automatic responses. The second type regards all those situations in 
which humans do not rely on pre-existing solutions, but invent new ones. In the 
following section we will provide some examples of moral templates, and we will 
account for the creation of new ones. 
Generally speaking, a moral template is a set of actions and decisions that have been 
successfully tried and tested within a society or culture. In this sense, it represents a 
variety of solutions that become culturally and socially accepted and that on occasion 
are deployed and thought to be the best course of action in certain circumstances. Some 
of these solutions are linguistically encoded in guidelines and imperatives. The Ten 
Commandments are an extraordinary example of moral templates, because they provide 
moral options and solutions that may help people in many circumstances.  Moral 
theories themselves are examples of this kind, because they provide a highly theoretical 
guide to various aspects of everyday life. Utilitarianism, Kantianism, and the social 
contract are thus ways of interpreting the world in a moral sense that give us explicit, 
coherent, and consistent reasons for our actions (Thagard, 2000). 
Many other templates are not explicitly laid out or expressed in a sentential way, but 
remain embodied in actions and bound up with various external structures and 
configurations. The case of the email we presented above is an example of this kind: 
writing is indeed an experienced and powerful template that can be used to reflect upon 
some complicated issue and/or to manage our emotions and feelings in order to assess 
whether they are appropriate or not (Harris, 2004; Love, 2004; Wheeler, 2004).  
Another example of a moral template that is not sentential, but embodied in an external 
structure is represented by the various institutions that we find in many societies and 
cultures. The institution of the family is an example of this kind. The family can be 
considered as a template that groups various successful solutions to some problems 
related to survival, but also to parental care, children’s education, the role of elderly 
people, property, the division of labor, and many other issues that can be the source of 
problems and conflict among human beings. 
The nature of these templates is highly conjectural. As a part of problem-solving 
activities, their validity rests on the fact that they are successfully experienced and 
transferred to others as cultural inheritance. But they still remain retractable and open to 
improvement. 
As noted above, sometimes pre-existing templates are not adequate to solve the 
problems that we face. As a matter of fact, templates themselves were once invented 
and created, because the options available at a certain moment were not adequate.  
First of all, moral innovations sometimes represent a radical revolution compared to 
past templates. Let us consider the case of democracy. Democracy represented an 
amazing moral innovation, compared with pre-existing forms of government. It brought 
into existence a series of moral entities that were totally neglected before its advent. For 
instance, the notion of citizenship gives a moral and equal status to everyone, a classic 
example being: liberté, égalité, fraternité! In other terms, the radical moral (rather than 
social and political) innovation was that every citizen had been appointed with certain 
basic rights that the State could not take away. In this sense, the idea of democracy 
creates morally intelligible entities, e.g. the citizens. The moral status of human beings 
dramatically changed after the modern democratic State had been created, and things 
changed again when women were first allowed to vote. These are examples of how 
morality changes in history, and, with it, the objects that are given moral meaning.   
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Secondly, moral innovations may arise from pre-existing templates that are occasionally 
revised and modified. However, the process of revising old moral habits and concepts 
may be extremely problematic. Consider, for instance, the case of gay marriage. Its 
proponents attempt to solve some conflicts related to extending a set of rights also to 
gay couples by modifying the entire institution of the family. This issue can be highly 
controversial, because its opponents argue that the traditional family is a template that 
has been highly corroborated to solve certain problems, but not others. A precautionary 
principle is thus advocated. In some countries, the problem of gay marriage has been 
solved in a different way: Gay couples could contract any details of their relationships 
in the same way that any other unmarried couple could. In this case, a new and different 
moral option is created by modifying, but not replacing, a pre-existing template.  
It is worth noting that not all moral inventions become widespread templates or 
solutions. Some of them can be occasionally employed by a lone person or a group, but 
soon discarded. That can be true, no matter if they were successful or not. First of all, 
because they can be immediately replaced by better ones. Secondly, because they 
cannot always be reproduced and/or transmitted. A new moral idea might be connected 
to a specific situation and context that cannot be replicated somewhere else. There are 
plenty of moral and social experiments that aimed at reconfiguring the entire western 
way of life. But some of them failed as general revolutionary movements, because they 
were strictly linked to a specific historical moment. Once social and political 
circumstances changed, their moral appeal soon disappeared.  
Finally, the failure or the success of new moral ideas also depends upon society and 
human decisions. Collectivities can adopt and discard ideas and innovations for various 
reasons that can independently be social, political or economical.  
All these examples we provided point to the conclusion that morality is a manipulative 
and “through doing” activity in its essence. It aims at manipulating and reconfiguring 
pre-existing ideas to solve some problem related to how to treat other human beings. As 
shown above, a great amount of our efforts are devoted to building various moral 
behavior templates that help us solve some specific problem. In doing this, the 
exploitation of external resources is crucial. Morality is fostered and enhanced by 
continuous moral delegations in which we transfer a large amount of ethical knowledge 
to various external and mediating structures, such as language, theories, institutions, 
technological artifacts, etc. In turn, what we have delegated to external structures (e.g. 
democracy, or democratic institutions, political representatives, pools, statistical 
services, etc.) could help us to generate new ideas: a re-projecting activity is thus carried 
out (Magnani, 2006b). It is a “re-projecting” activity because we introduce information 
each consecutive  time, as it has been modified outside our brain. In this sense, 
individuals create new knowledge through the exploitation of external 
supports/resources. For we maintain that morality is a distributed phenomenon 
(Magnani, 2006c).  That is, we cannot refer to morality as something that happens only 
within the human mind, but it is somehow distributed over a set of external resources 
and internal capabilities.  
In order to detail these concepts, and to outline a new theoretical framework we 
illustrate in the next subsection the notion of moral mediator, first introduced by 
Magnani (2005a and 2005b). 
 
The notion of moral mediator 
Much of the behavior we conduct through learned habits – the tacit templates of action  
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described above – is devoted to building vast new sources of information and 
knowledge: external moral mediators. Generally speaking, moral mediators represent a 
kind of redistribution of the moral effort through managing objects and information in 
such a way that we can overcome the poverty and the unsatisfactory character of the 
moral options immediately represented or found internally. 
In the example of the email, the software we use, for instance, Thunderbird, can be 
considered as a moral mediator, because it unearths additional information that is not 
available within our mind, and it helps us to overcome the paucity of internal moral 
options – principles and prototypes, etc. –available to us (Johnson, 1993). Indeed, other 
moral mediators are built by human collectives in a conscious way; this is the case with 
some objectified rules or principles created with a particular goal in mind or with long 
established ways of producing moral effects (religious rites, for example).  
Using moral mediators is more than just a way to move the world toward desirable 
goals: it is an action that can play a moral role and therefore warrants moral 
consideration. We have said that when people do not have adequate information or lack 
the capacity to act morally upon the world, they can restructure their worlds in order to 
simplify and solve moral tasks. Moral mediators are also used to reveal latent 
constraints in the human-environment system, and these discoveries grant us precious 
new ethical information. Imagine, for instance, a wife whose work requires long hours 
away from her husband, and that her frequent absences cause conflict in the 
relationship. To improve their marriage, she restructures her life so that she can spend 
more quality time with her spouse, an action that can cause variables affected by 
“unexpected” and “positive” events in the relationship to co-vary with informative, 
sentimental, sexual, emotional, and, generally speaking, bodily variables. Before the 
couple adopted a reconfigured “social” order – that is, increased time together – there 
was no discernible link between these hidden and overt variables; a new arrangement 
has the power to reveal important new “information,” which, in our example, might 
come from a revitalized sex life, surprisingly similar emotional concerns, or a 
previously unrecognized intellectual like-mindedness. 
A realigned social relationship is just one example of an external moral mediator; 
natural phenomena can also serve this purpose. In fact, many external things that have 
traditionally been considered morally inert can be transformed into moral mediators. 
For example, we can use animals, the earth, or cultural entities to identify previously 
unrecognized moral features of human beings, or we can employ external “tools” like 
writing, narrative, ritual, and institutions to reconfigure unsatisfactory social orders. 
Hence, not all moral tools are inside the head – many are shared and distributed in 
external objects and structures that function as objectified ethical devices.  
While almost any sort of entity can help to mediate our moral outlook, certain 
technological artifacts can be considered über moral mediators – those equipped with 
artificial intelligence and the ability to be directly engaged in ethical reasoning and 
behavior. We must not only recognize the ethical ramifications of using such machines, 
but also of allowing them ethical autonomy toward human users as well as other 
devices; in the process, we must assuage human fears about machine intelligence 
(Anderson, Anderson, and Armen, 2005; Moor, 2005). Developing ways to deal with 
artificial intelligence is a new field of research – called “machine ethics” – that involves 
many interesting topics: improving interaction between artificial and natural intelligence 
systems by adding an ethical dimension to technological devices; using ethical 
strategies to enhance machine-to-machine communication and cooperation; developing  
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systems that provide expert ethical guidance; establishing decision-making procedures 
for ethical theories with multiple prima facie duties that present conflicting 
perspectives; and assessing the impact of machine ethics on society. 
External moral mediators of all kinds can function as components of a memory system 
that crosses the boundary between person and environment. For example, they 
transform the tasks involved in simple manipulations that promote further moral 
inferences at the level of model-based abduction. In the above case of the wife seeking 
moral protection of her marriage, she transforms it by manipulating her behavior so as 
to increase the quality time spent with her husband, and thus finds new information that 
allows her to abduce/reach new internal model-based ideas and/or feelings – new 
motivating images, for example, or constructive emotions – about her husband and/or 
marriage. When the everyday life of a previously abused child is manipulated by 
placing her with a foster family, for instance, the new setting is a moral mediator that 
can help her abduce new model-based internal experience, images, emotions, or 
analogies through which she may be able to recalibrate her conceptions of adults, her 
past, and of abuse in general.  
Actions executed through tacit templates can even enhance one’s level of physical 
sensitivity: I can alter my bodily experience of pain by following the previously 
mentioned control of sense data template – that is, through unconsciously modifying the 
experience of my body and changing its relationships with humans or non-humans in 
distress, I may, for instance, create new, empathetic moral ways to help other human 
beings. Mother Theresa’s personal moral feeling and consideration of pain was certainly 
shaped by her proximity to starving and miserable people and by her manipulation of 
both her and their own bodies. In many people, moral training is often related to this 
kind of spontaneous (and, sometimes, “lucky”) manipulation of their own bodies and 
sense data that causes them to build (increase?) morality immediately and non-
reflectively “through doing.” 
Throughout history, women have traditionally been thought to place more value on 
personal relationships than men do, and they are often regarded as more adept in 
situations requiring intimacy and caring. It would seem that women’s basic moral 
orientation emphasizes taking care of both people and external things through personal 
and specific acts rather than by relating to others through an abstract, general concern 
for humanity. The ethics of care does not consider the abstract “obligation” to be as 
essential; moreover, it does not require that we impartially promote the interests of 
everyone alike. Rather, it focuses on small-scale relationships with people and external 
objects, so that, for example, it is not important to “think” of helping disadvantaged 
children all over the world (as men tend to aim at doing) but to “do” so in specific cases 
when called upon anywhere (Urban Walker, 1996: 276; Johns 2005). 
The conception of morality “through doing” does not mean that this so-called female 
attitude, being more closely related to emotion, should be considered less deontological 
or less rational and therefore a lower form of moral expression. I contend that many of 
us can become more intuitive, loving parents and, in certain situations, learn to privilege 
the act of “taking care” of our children by educating our feelings – maybe by heeding 
“Kantian” rules (Carse, 1999). The route from reason to feeling (and, of course, from 
feeling to reason) is continuous in ethics. Many people are suspicious of moral 
emotional evaluations because emotions are vulnerable to personal and contextual 
attributes. Nevertheless, there are moral circumstances that require at least partially 
emotional evaluations, which become particularly useful when combined with  
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intellectual (Kantian) aspects of morality. 
Consequently, “taking care” is an important way to look at people and objects, and, as a 
form of morality accomplished “through doing,” it achieves status as a fundamental 
kind of moral inference and knowledge. Respecting things like people is a natural 
extension of the ethics of care; a person who treats “non-human” household objects with 
solicitude, for example, is more likely to be seen as someone who will treat human 
beings in a similarly conscientious fashion. Consequently, using this cognitive concept, 
even a lowly kitchen utensil can be considered a moral mediator. 
 
 
The social side of moral mediation 
 
Broadly speaking, anything can be thought of as a moral mediator. It depends on the 
cognitive meaning that individuals attribute to something outside their brain. However, 
how can we use these mediators? Is society, and/or social behavior a sort of moral 
mediator? In other terms, do we need to redefine social interactions? These issues are 
questioned here, since the aim of this section is to outline the way “through doing” 
morality, and moral reasoning in general is embedded in the social context. 
 
The point on individual cognition and morality  
Since Edgeworth (1881) many attempts have been made to restrict the economic field of 
studies to something measurable, or merely quantitative (Becker, 1974; Friedman, 1953; 
Friedman, and Savage, 1948), and explained through hedonistic models of economic 
behavior. The result has been the divide between ethical and economic fields of studies 
(Etzioni, 1988). Models of economic behavior have usually been thought of as being 
founded on self-interested individuals seeking utility maximization (Mas-Colell, 
Whinston, and Green, 1995; Etzioni, 1988; Frank, 1987, 1988; Sen, 1977). However, 
this is not the case for actual behavior, nor is it the case for the way rationality seems to 
work (Simon, 1947, 1955, 1979). The problem is that of defining human behavior and 
the environment in which individuals behave. Re-defining rationality, complicating 
economics, or including ethical, emotional, or political thinking, to the basic economic 
man, becomes a somehow traditional issue since many scholars wrote on it (Casson, 
1995; Hirschman, 1970; Sen, 1987). 
As argued and discussed in the last section, individuals lean on external supports which 
they store their knowledge in. External supports are of various kinds; for instance, 
sheets of paper, computers, but also other individuals, and inanimate objects such as 
pencils, bottles or any other thing to which we confer cognitive meaning. They help 
individuals in their cognitive performances, so that they are able to “play” with them in 
relation to their internal capabilities (Bardone, and Secchi, 2005, 2006). 
This process, that we defined above, is composed of two essential parts. In fact, we can 
divide (a) the externalization process from (b) the re-projecting phase (Magnani, 2006b, 
2006c; Bardone, and Secchi, 2006). The former is related to the way individuals confer 
meaning to situations, objects, people, and all external resources while the latter refers 
to information re-introduction, and ordinarily follows externalizations. In this part, we 
focus on the way individuals externalize cognitive competencies to things, animals, 
cyborgs, or individuals (Clark, 2003; Magnani, 2006c). 
When we state that external things play both a cognitive and moral role in any decision-
making process, we are arguing that the interaction between them and the individual  
  11
follow a sort of mediated process (Magnani, 2005b). These external things (we may call 
them, more technically, “resources”) play a role of mediators that uncover hidden 
information and moral views. In particular, we are interested in the moral mediation that 
actually occurs; and we presented and analyzed this issue in the first section of the 
article. External cognitive and moral resources carry information (or knowledge, in the 
case of humans) that are normally exploited by individuals. This exploitation opens a 
new radical approach to (cognition, and) ethics because it relies on the manipulation and 
“through doing” hypotheses. It is apparent that the act of manipulation defines an open-
ended process, where individual morality (and cognition) is shaped by the interaction 
with external resources. Cognition is an ongoing process, and morality is but a part of 
this human activity. 
The point that we now want to address relates to the type of moral mediation. We 
describe a real process or, that is to say, we aim at describing the way humans create 
new moral templates through everyday behavior (that is, through a kind of 
manipulation). Of course, one of the implications of this approach is that individuals 
need moral knowledge to behave successfully in many situations. Moral reasoning and 
behavior is something that varies, because it needs to fit a given situation, or to solve a 
concrete or speculative problem. This was our starting point, at the beginning of the first 
section. Do individuals develop “moral strategies”? Moreover, if so, what kind of 
“moral strategies” do they develop? Is there anything like a social moral mediator? Do 
we need anything like that in a social-organizational context? This is what we try to 
address in the next sub-section. 
 
A theory of docile society 
Ordinary theories of economic behavior normally do not address morality (Mas-Colell, 
Whinston, and Green, 1995) and, when this is the case, they do not point out the ways 
through which morality shapes individuals’ cognition (here used in the sense of 
rationality). 
As we mentioned above, economic models present self-interested individuals aiming at 
maximizing their utility function. What happens if we suppose that individuals think 
and behave altruistically more than selfishly? And, what explains such a different 
economic system? Or, similarly, how about defining a model of social interaction where 
individuals are not merely selfish or altruist, but where these alternatives are defined 
through the “cognitive style” they adopt? 
These questions may appear simplistic. Nevertheless, they underline a very crucial point 
because they refer to the core of social interaction. At the basis of social interaction, we 
may argue that, from a behavioral point of view, individuals act altruistically more than 
selfishly (Axelrod, 1984; Frank, 2004). There is no agreement on the way altruism is 
defined (Khalil, 2004; Lunt, 2004; Sesardic, 1995; Wilkinson, 2004); generally 
speaking, we refer to it as the act of giving something to someone, the altruist bearing 
the cost for behaving that way (Simon, 1993). So, altruistic behavior is not without its 
cost, but it involves some other kind of advantage for the altruist. When referring to 
“cost,” we do not necessarily mean that in economic terms, the altruist has to spend 
money, to sell something or to decrease her/his economic wealth. It might be something 
that involves time, emotional expenditure or moral engagement. For example, we may 
think of Mother Theresa helping people in Calcutta, and how she spent her time and 
became emotionally and morally involved. However, given her lifestyle, we cannot 
think of her as being at all concerned for her own economic wealth. Above all, she was  
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an altruistic individual. In summary, altruism is the self-deprivation of something that 
the altruist passes on to other individuals. 
Is altruism a fundamental principle in our societies? Does it lie at the core of social 
interaction? Herbert Simon presented a model of altruistic behavior in his later works 
(1990; 1993). He suggested that individuals behaving altruistically fit the social and 
economic environment more successfully than selfish ones. The point is that the 
altruistic has a kind of moral concern toward society; they have a vision of their role in 
society, i.e. of their interplay with the other members of society. The altruist, in other 
terms, thinks about herself/himself as a social being, and realizes that society, and other 
people, matter in solving problems related to human lives (Secchi, 2005). Broadly 
speaking, this is the way we ordinarily think. This is the way we manage our lives. 
However, we think about “altruism” as something marginal to the problems of everyday 
life, and we normally match it to moral or emotional parenthesis in our lives. As 
scholars show using very simple algorithms (Simon, 1993; Knudsen, 2003; Secchi, 
2005), the kind of “technical” altruism defined above is embedded in our way of 
behaving and thinking (see also Yung-An, and Day-Yang, 2003). We need to move a 
step further: what is the framework (or the “strategy” we mentioned above) that allows 
altruists to behave altruistically? Why do altruists have a social idea of human 
interactions? 
The answer has been suggested, again, by Herbert Simon. Individuals behave pro-
socially because they are “docile,” or they tend “to depend on suggestions, 
recommendations, persuasion, and information obtained through social channels as a 
major basis for choice” (Simon, 1993: 156). This is a way to define the pro-social 
behavior or “socializability” of individuals. However, what Simon points out in this 
definition is more than simply an argument that individuals develop pro-social attitudes, 
because he underlines that they depend on “social channels” in their decision-making 
processes. This is obviously a cognitive issue, and Simon’s docility is the “social side” 
of the general human tendency to lean on external resources (see above, and Bardone, 
and Secchi, 2005; Magnani, 2006a). In other terms, docility is a sort of mediator that 
can indeed be defined as moral, and allows individuals to develop knowledge about 
society and other human beings. However, we need to say more. Accordingly, docility 
can be also regarded as a sort of model-based social reasoning, since it guides and helps 
people in a variety of situations in developing, modifying and creating knowledge (for a 
definition of model-based reasoning, see Magnani, 2001; Magnani and Dossena, 2005). 
Again, the moral mediator is something that adds moral information and provides 
alternative viewpoints on a particular situation, problem, dilemma, etc. This supports 
human bounded moral rationality, since it develops new templates. The docility attitude 
is something that drives cognitive information, and thus moral knowledge, through 
social channels. In this sense, we can classify it as a moral mediator. 
 
Implications 
Social interactions are based on information exchanges that the docility tendency 
sustains and develops. This statement allows us to underline some of the basic 
implications of this approach: (a) docility has both active and passive sides, (b) it passes 
through social channels and affects society overall, (c) the “others” perspective is the 
core of our social being, so that morality is in fact embedded in the way we think and 
behave. 
Simon stresses the passive side of docility, when he states that it is the “tendency to  
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depend” on social channels. Moreover, we can say that the word itself – docility – calls 
for something that is somehow passive. Though, if we think of social interactions in 
general, we may well define both active and passive flows of information. It is true, on 
the one hand, that we depend on variables “obtained through social channels” and, on 
the other hand, that we provide information, suggestions, and the like through these 
social channels (Bardone, and Secchi, 2006; Secchi, 2005). From this angle, docility is a 
“mediator” in the sense that it defines the general tendency to think of social channels as 
being part of our way of obtaining and providing information. It is worth noting that, in 
many cases, the only way to obtain information is to “manipulate” these social channels, 
i.e. to provide information at the same time. Providing information is a way to change 
the environment, and to wait for something different to happen. The information 
process is a two-way task. Think of a conversation, a company that publishes its 
financial or social report, a crying baby, and a marketing manager that shows research 
results in a table to her/his staff: these processes, and many others, are two-sided, i.e. 
they intend to provide information in order to gather new feedback information, thereby 
obtaining a different cognitive perspective on the issue. Thus, docility is the “medium” 
through which individuals exchange information using social channels. The point here 
is not to question where, or how, social becomes moral and vice-versa, but to underline 
the fact that we do ordinarily manipulate economic, social, and moral issues/problems 
through the docility channel. 
The second implication relates to the way docility increases its power in society overall. 
We move a step back to the point we started from. We write that altruism is the basic 
tendency of individual behavior, in the sense that altruistic individuals encounter a 
“social vision” more often than selfish ones. This perspective allows us to say that true 
altruistic behavior does not discriminate toward the person receiving the altruistic 
action, and operates regardless of whether the recipient is selfish or altruistic. This is 
because altruistic behavior is motivated by other hypotheses that are based on a broader 
vision of society. This implies that altruistic action passes onto other individuals that 
may or may not reciprocate (on distinctions between direct and indirect reciprocity, see 
the interesting Tullberg, 2004). However, the point here is not whether individuals 
reciprocate or not, but the fact that this “social vision” provides its perpetrators with a 
greater “fitness”, i.e. they fit a social context more successfully than selfish individuals. 
As we have learned, “social vision” is but an aspect of what we called the “docility” 
attitude, and we may call the increasing tendency to lean on external social channels the 
“docility effect” (Secchi, 2005; Bardone, and Secchi, 2006). Broadly speaking, this 
“effect” is the way individual attitudes become evident and useful at a social level, thus 
“docility” tends to be a mediator for every member of the social system. 
Finally, the third implication relates to the “others” perspective, and its moral meaning. 
This is the core of the docility argument, because we are stating that everything we 
learn, think, do, create, or provide (we might say, “externalize”) belongs to the tendency 
to exploit social channels, i.e. other individuals, in this case. One of the main 
contributions of this perspective is that it underlines that individuals “manipulate” their 
own and other people’s information. This action has some moral implications. 
Regardless of whether it is a Kantian, utilitarian, hedonistic, or Hobbesian ethical 
perspective that we want to apply to the specific case, individuals need to fit the social 
context. They modify their original moral sentiment in order to provide a solution to the 
problem they are facing. How do they do it? They use their tendency to rely on social 
channels to reach a better evaluation of the variables involved and to find a better  
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solution. In other terms, they use docility mediation. Since this is an ongoing process, 




The assumption that individuals are docile helps us understanding many of their 
characteristics. The simple proposition that a human maintains pro-social attitudes 
doesn’t define anything more than a general approach toward individual interactions. 
However, the docility perspective adds something more to this general approach, since 
it bases human behavior, and cognitive processes, on this social attitude.  
We have seen that “being docile” means providing and obtaining information, 
suggestions, comments, and the like from social channels. In addition, docility is a 
fundamental attribute for decision-making and problem solving activities, because it 
mobilizes different kinds of information. Individuals are set for receiving information 
through social channels, and they also manipulate, as we described above, these social 
channels through interactive modifications. In other terms, they acquire more 
knowledge through the interaction of social channels. This is exactly what we mean 
with the words “through doing.” What’s new about this approach? 
We note and can affirm for the first time, that docility is a mediating concept because it 
helps in connecting pro-social behavior to the cognitive mechanisms. Moreover, in 
doing so we can also define the variables through which morality is not static, nor 
defined a priori, when speaking of individual behavior. We found that moral thinking is 
part of a more general cognitive process, that we defined in two phases – externalization 
and re-projecting – where docility mediates moral meanings and helps people change 
their position. 
The activity of mediation can be analyzed in relation to the variables that constitute the 
docility effect. For example, how can we define social channels? Can we make a 
weighted influence of social channels influencing individual behavior? Can we define 
different kind of moral mediations that originate form docile individuals? Can docility 
become “structured” in social organizations? Does it mean that moral thinking is 
connected to the social organization considered? How can we define the role that 
individual representations of moral mediators have in choosing the social channels 
through which to conduct explicit docile behavior?  
These and many other questions are currently being addressed in our ongoing research 
(citations concealed to maintain anonymity). Ideas for future research are studying how 
these variables affect moral decision-making and problem solving activities from both 
theoretic and empirical angles and of merging the two traditions of economic modeling 
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